



# Several recipes for motherhood and apple pie

**Brian K. Reid**  
**Research director,**  
**Bell Labs Silicon Valley**  
**13 June 2000**

# Security is good



**Lucent Technologies**  
Bell Labs Innovations



- **We want to be secure.**
- **We will be careful.**
- **We will be diligent.**
- **We will not make mistakes.**
- **We will keep the bad people out of our computers.**
- **We will let only good people into our computers.**
- **We will be secure.**
  
- **Life will be excellent.**

# We don't have to worry...



- **We use the best firewall. We're safe.**
- **We use the strongest encryption available. We're safe.**
- **We have backups onsite and offsite. We're safe.**
- **We have no HR issues. Our employees are always perfectly happy. We're safe.**

# What kind of security?



- **National security**
- **Social security**
- **Physical security**
- **Emotional security**
- **Negotiable security**
- **Financial security**
- **Information security**
  
- **Internet security**

# What kind of security??



- **National security**
- **Social security**
- **Physical security**
- **Emotional security**
- **Negotiable security**
- **Financial security**
- **Information security**
- **Internet security**

**What do these concepts have in common?**

- **Stasis**
- **Comfort**
- **Control**
- **Impossibility**

**You can run, but you can't hide. Absolute security is not only impossible, it's meaningless.**

# Security is feeling safe



- National security
- Social security
- Physical security
- Emotional security
- Negotiable security
- Financial security
- Information security
  
- Internet security

One really good way to *feel* safe is to *be* safe.

Other techniques are cheaper and less intrusive.

Some are even possible.

# A visit to the spin doctor



**A conversation in northern New Mexico:**

**“Um, Sir, you know how that runaway forest fire destroyed our primary and secondary backup sites, and how all of our data was lost?”**

**“Yes.”**

**“Well, we just got a complete copy from China, and we’re back in business.”**

# Odds, not guarantees



- **Effective national security cannot guarantee that you will survive. Only that most people will.**
- **Financial security doesn't mean that you will never be desperate for money. Only that it's very unlikely.**
- **Emotional security doesn't mean that you will never be unhappy. Just that it won't ruin your life.**
- **Most people can't break in, and the ones that *can* will probably break into somebody else's.**



# Security and publicity



**If 10 million people live in a city**

**And one of them was mugged last year**

**Then you could say, honestly, that the city  
has good security**

**Unless the one who was mugged is the  
mayor's child...**

**Or the newspaper editor's child**

**(It would be true, but you couldn't say it)**

# What's the point?



- **Security isn't about technology**
- **It's about**
  - **Formal procedure**
  - **Recognizing the limitations of human beings**
  - **Publicity management**
  - **Risk management**
  - **Auditability**
- **These factors all enable you to be more confident that you have better security**

# But technology helps



- **Technology enables vigilance**
- **Technology lets you automate something that you understand, so you can be more precise**
  - **(Example: LASIK)**
- **Technology increases your reach**

# Fortification is not security



- **Strong barriers are nice**
- **But they are not enough. Security requires vigilance and flexibility more than fortification**
- **(Remember the Maginot line?)**
- **Vigilance requires training, cleverness, alertness, and experience**

# All power tools can kill



- **Power tools enable a trained person to do a job better**
- **Any power tool can be misused**
- **The more power the tool has, the more damage it can cause if misused**
- **Security tools are no exception to this rule**
- **But it takes more expertise to see damage caused by a firewall than by a chainsaw**

# Step 1: the official nightmare



**What is it, exactly, that you are afraid of:**

- **Data leaving your facility without authorization?**
- **Data *entering* your facility without authorization?**
- **Data missing?**
- **Data damaged or altered, visibly or invisibly?**
- **Authorized changes, but untraceable?**
- **Fraudulent transactions?**
  
- **Publicity claiming that any of the above have happened, whether it is true or not?**

# Nightmare examples 1



## **Unauthorized exit: most common nightmare**

- **Medical history**
- **Trade secrets**
- **Political plans**
- **Personal information**

# Nightmare examples 2



## **Unauthorized entry of data**

- **Real estate or financial data**
- **Degrees or education achieved**
- **Birth records for citizenship**
- **First claim date**



# Nightmare examples 3



## **Missing data**

- **Criminal record or motor vehicle history**
- **Real estate ownership**
- **Vital statistics: you were never born**

## Step 2: quantifying risk



**What is the cost (and to whom) of failure?**

- **Bad reputation?**
- **Injury or death?**
- **Loss of money?**
- **Small loss to many people, not major to any of them?**
- **Catastrophic loss to some?**
- **Loss of public confidence?**

# Measuring cost



- In banking, we assume reversibility
- Money can be put back
- Many situations are not reversible:
  - Elections
  - Damaged reputations
  - Computerized medical procedures
- Cost measurement in irreversible situation is much harder

## Step 3: think about a solution



- **Now that you have quantified the risk, evaluate the cost of a solution**
- **Compare it with the cost of not having a solution.**
- **Sometimes the right answer is to do nothing.**
- **Sometimes that is a very wrong answer.**

# Story: Allentown telephones



- A company once manufactured telephones in Pennsylvania
- Their bookkeeper told them that phones were being stolen
- They sought advice from a security expert, and from an accountant
- The conclusion....

# Loss rate limits



- We can assume that each corrupt employee can steal no more than one telephone per day
- To steal a telephone you must somehow carry it out of the factory
- To steal data you need do no such thing. We can make no assumptions about the amount of data one corrupt employee can steal in a day

# Cyber people are invisible



- **Physical crimes (theft, vandalism, forgery, extortion, etc) must obey the laws of nature.**
- **Did children stop believing in Santa Claus when they were old enough to compute that he would have to fly faster than the speed of light?**
- **Cyber crimes do not need to obey the laws of nature. A cyber vandal really *can* be everywhere at once.**

# Don't ever admit it, but



- In the physical world, a small amount of fraudulent activity is inevitable.
- We assume that the amount is small because we would see evidence if it started to get large.
- In the online world, where things are invisible, we cannot have the comfort of trusting our 5 senses.



# Identity and authentication



**Our activities require various levels of authentication:**

- **A trip to the local bank**
- **A trip to a private Swiss bank**
- **Voting**
- **Joining your spouse behind closed doors**

**Any activity that can be performed online also needs authentication**

# Wait a minute...



- **The solution depends on ability to:**
  - **Identify people or their actions**
  - **Record what happens**
  - **Audit it**
  - **Monitor to look for unexpected events**
  - **Ensure that fraud and failure in automated system is within expectations**
- **This requires authentication**

# Strong authentication



- **Today's state of the art in authentication:**
  - **You must have something**
  - **And you must know something**
  - **To authenticate, verify that they have the object and know the secret**
- **“Have” requirement: can't share**
- **“Know” requirement: can't steal**
- **But you've all seen “Gattica”, right?**

# Here the apples get sour



- **Tradition in the USA: people can have the right to be anonymous**
- **Federal legislation in the 1960's forbade the use of strong authentication for voting**
- **In fighting cyber crime, strong authentication is very important**
- **Instant conflict between old traditions and new needs**

# Perfect security?



- **Perfect for whom?**
- **Literature has tales of a future where government controls everything in the name of security**
- **This is why, in our country, the military is not in charge**
- **Democracy requires checks and balances. Here we balance need for security against need for anonymity**

# Security and privacy



- We all agree that security and privacy are excellent ingredients for apple pie
- What happens when *your* need for security...
- Interferes with *my* need for privacy?
- What happens if state security requires that citizens have no privacy?
- What happens if citizens' privacy endangers state security?

# The challenge for technologists .



- **Never forget that technology is a tool, not a goal in itself**
- **Even though it's fun, lucrative, and makes the whole world envious of California**
- **Recognize that the political and social agenda must always dominate the technical agenda**
- **Though wealth, from technology, can influence the agenda**

# The challenge for executives



- Needs of information security will always conflict with principles of privacy and anonymity
- Design and implementation of security procedures always requires educated compromise
- We technologists can talk about best practices, but executives must do final balance
- Political risks are always the greatest





Thank you for your attention

**Brian K. Reid, PhD  
Research director,  
Bell Labs Silicon Valley  
13 June 2000**

Bell Labs is the innovation arm of Lucent Technologies  
and, historically,  
of much of the technological world

**<http://pa.bell-labs.com/~bkreid/13june2000.ppt>**